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ABSTRACT
GNSS are well known to be accurate providers of position information across the globe. Because of high signal avail-
abilities, robust receivers, and well-populated constellations, operators typically believe that the location information
provided by their GNSS receiver is correct. More sophisticated users are concerned with the integrity of the derived
location information; for example, employ RAIM algorithms to address possible satellite failure modes.
The most common attacks on GNSS availability and integrity are known as jamming and spoofing. Jamming involves
the transmission of signals that interfere with GNSS reception so that the receiver is unable to provide a position or
time solution. Various methods to detect jamming, and possibly overcome it, have been considered in the literature.
Spoofing is the transmission of counterfeit GNSS signals so as to mislead a GNSS receiver into reporting an inaccurate
position or time. If undetected, spoofing might be much more dangerous than a jamming attack. A typical maritime
concern is a spoofer convincing a tanker traveling up a channel to a harbor that it is off track of the channel.
A variety of approaches have been proposed in the literature to recognize spoofing; many of these are based on the
RF signal alone as, in some sense, they are the simplest to implement. Of interest here are methods which compare
GNSS information to measurements available from other, non-GNSS sensors. Examined examples include IMUs,
radars, and ranges/pseudoranges from non-GNSS signals. In all cases the data from these others sensors is compared
to the position information from the GNSS receiver to assess its integrity.
Triangulation of position from bearing measurements is a well-known localization technique, especially for the
mariner. This paper considers the use of bearing information to detect GNSS spoofing in a 2-D environment. A typ-
ical marine application is a ship entering a harbor and using an alidade to sight landmarks; for mobile, autonomous
vehicles the sensor might be a camera taking a bearing to a nearby vehicle or to a signpost. This paper presents
a mathematical formulation of the problem and the sensor data, develops a statistical model of the measurements
relative to the GNSS position output, constructs a generalized likelihood ratio test detection algorithm based on the
Neyman-Pearson performance criterion (maximizing probability of detection while bounding the probability of false
alarm), and examines performance of the test, both through analysis and experimentation. A comparison to using
both range and bearing is included to show the utility and limitations of bearing data to spoof detection.
INTRODUCTION
GNSS are well known to be accurate providers of position information across the globe. Because of high signal
availabilities, capable/robust receivers, and well-populated satellite constellations, operators typically believe that
the location information provided by their GNSS receiver is correct. More sophisticated users are concerned with
the integrity of the derived location information; for example, RAIM algorithms were developed to address possible
satellite failure modes.
The most common attacks on GNSS are known as jamming and spoofing; both are based on the creation of radio
signals in the GNSS band. Jamming involves the transmission of signals that interfere with GNSS reception so that
the receiver is unable to provide a position or time solution. Various methods to detect jamming, and possibly
overcome it, have been considered in the literature. Spoofing is the transmission of counterfeit GNSS signals so as
to mislead a GNSS receiver into reporting an inaccurate position or time. If undetected, spoofing might be much
more dangerous than a jamming attack. While spoofing might be benign (e.g. a reradiator leaking GNSS signals
outside of a airplane hanger), a typical maritime concern is malicious spoofing that convinces a tanker traveling up
a channel to a harbor that it is off track of the channel.
A variety of approaches have been proposed in the literature to recognize spoofing and can vary widely based
upon the assumed capabilities and a priori knowledge of the spoofer. Many of these are based on the RF signal
alone as, in some sense, they are the simplest to implement. Of interest here are methods which compare GNSS
information to measurements available from other, non-GNSS sensors. In 2003 Warner and Johnston [1] suggested
such methods, calling them sanity checks; they did not further develop the idea. More recently there have been a
several examinations of using different non-GNSS signals. In all cases the data from these others sensors is compared
to the position information from the GNSS receiver to assess its integrity:
• In 2014 these authors considered the use of IMU data to detect spoofing of a Coast Guard ship [2]. Specifically,
the pitch and roll measurements from the ship’s gyrocompass were used to predict the relative spatial trajectory
of a GPS antenna mounted high up on the ship. This movement was then correlated to the GPS measurements
(with the linear motion of the ship being removed) to detect spoofing. The concept was that the spoofer would
not correctly generate the ”wiggle” due to the sea state and, hence, be identifiable. It was seen that even low
sea-state yielded good detectability.
• In 2014 and 2015 Khanafseh and Pervan employed RAIM residuals from a tightly coupled aircraft GPS/INS
to detect spoofing [3]. In this case, the tightly coupled INS and GPS system tracked the aircraft’s motion due
to winds. As above, if the spoofer does not generate this ”wiggle” correctly, it could be detected.
• In 2015 Carson and Bevly discussed the use of range and bearing (radar) information to detect GPS spoofing
for a platoon of vehicles [4]. They assumed the availability of Relative Position Vectors (RPVs) between pairs of
vehicles from a radar sensor. To detect spoofing of a single vehicle they compared the RPV to the corresponding
GPS difference vector, declaring spoofing if the difference was too great. Their focus was on a pair of vehicles
only.
• In 2016 these authors presented methods to detect GNSS spoofing for a single vehicle employing a range
measurement from one or more fixed beacons [5] (in avionics applications this sensor could be a DME or
barometric altimeter). This work included a full description of the statistical hypothesis tests (Neyman-Pearson
criterion) with details on performance analysis and Monte Carlo examples. It was observed that a single range
measurement could not detect all spoofing events (e.g. position variation along a circle centered at the ranging
source was undetectable), but that two or more ranges could detect position spoofing with high accuracy.
• Later in 2016 these authors extended the range-based concept of GNSS spoof detection to pseudorange mea-
surements allowing the inclusion of RF signals such as eLoran or R-Mode [6]. As such signals are typically
linked to UTC in some fashion, these methods would also allow for the detection of time spoofing.
• In 2017 these authors extended these same range/pseudorange concepts to spoof detection for platoons of
vehicles [7]. This approach of the problem of spoof detection is especially effective against localized spoofers
that do not impact all users.
• In 2017 these authors considered the application of the position output of an independent PNT (position,
navigation, time) system as the source of non-GNSS data for spoof detection [8].
Figure 1: A typical alidade (left) and use of one on a Coast Guard vessel (right).
Triangulation of position from bearing measurements is a well-known localization technique [9,10], especially for the
mariner. This paper considers the use of bearing information to detect GNSS spoofing in a 2-D environment. A
typical marine application is a ship entering a harbor and using an alidade to sight landmarks (see Figure 1); for
mobile, autonomous vehicles the sensor might be a camera taking a bearing to a nearby vehicle or to a signpost.
As in our previous works [5–8], this paper presents a mathematical formulation of the problem and the sensor data,
develops a statistical model of the measurements relative to the GNSS position output, constructs a generalized
likelihood ratio test detection algorithm based on the Neyman-Pearson performance criterion (maximizing probability
of detection while bounding probability of false alarm), and examines performance of the test, both through analysis
and experimentation. A comparison to using both range and bearing is included to show the utility and limitations
of bearing data to spoof detection.
THE SETUP
Imagine a two dimensional positioning problem as depicted in Figure 2. The red square represents a mobile vehicle
whose location is of interest; the variables e and n represent its true east and north coordinates (horizontal and
vertical in this diagram), respectively, in some local coordinate frame. The blue diamonds represent bearing targets
at known locations (ek, nk), k = 1, 2, . . .m. The true bearings are
φk ≡ atan2 (ek − e, nk − n)
(reversing the east and north components in the standard atan2 notation yields a 4 quadrant inverse tangent in
which due north is zero degrees and the angle increases clockwise). We assume that a GNSS measurement of the
2-D position is available, denote it as (ê, n̂), as are bearing measurements, the φ̂k, k = 1, 2 . . .m.
The goal here is to test for spoofing which is defined as the existence of radio signals that would result in an erroneous
position solution at the GNSS receiver. It is assumed that spoofing does not impact the bearing measurements in
any way. (More generally, the scenario is that the GNSS results might be faulty and our interest is in employing
the bearing measurements as an integrity check.) Define the null hypothesis, H0, as the case in which no spoofer is
present and the alternative hypothesis, H1, for when a spoofer is present.
Under both hypotheses the GNSS measurement is assumed to be a pair of Gaussian random variables[
ê
n̂
]
∼ N
([
µe
µn
]
, σ2I2
)
(1)
(This notation includes the mean vector and covariance matrix of this length two vector; hence, as parameterized
these are independent east and north measurements with equal variances. The extension to correlated variables
appears later.). Under H0 the means are the true location, µe = e and µn = n and let the variance be σ
2 = σ20 ;
...
Figure 2: The general configuration of the vehicle and m bearing targets.
under H1 the means are some other location, say µe = u and µn = v, and the spoofer creates some other variance,
say σ2s . Meanwhile the bearing measurements are assumed to be unaffected by the spoofer. We assume a Gaussian
model for each
φ̂k ∼ N
(
φk, σ
2
k
)
providing for different levels of accuracy on the different bearing measurements. While this model is not perfect, that
the bearings only fall in the interval (−180◦, 180◦] (with wraparound), we assume that the range accuracy is on the
order of degrees, or less, and ignore the slight difference in the model. Further, all of the measurements are assumed
to be statistically independent. A more significant issue is potential bias in the bearings, possibly equal across the
bearing measurements, and could be the basis for future research.
HYPOTHESIS TESTING
Hypothesis testing between a pair of hypotheses, H0 and H1, is usually implemented by computing a scalar function
of the observed data, T (data), called the test statistic, and comparing this value to a constant called the threshold.
If the test statistic exceeds the threshold, the test result is a decision for H1; if not, H0. Symbolically, this can be
written as
T (data)
H1
>
<
H0
λ
in which λ represents the threshold (yet to be selected).
The goal here is to detect the occurrence of spoofing. Under the Neyman-Pearson approach the probability of false
alarm (the probability of deciding for H1 when H0 is true) is limited (upper bounded) to some preselected value
(often close to zero) and the test is constructed to maximize the probability of detection (the probability of correctly
deciding H1 when H1 is true). For this criterion the optimum test statistic is well known to be the likelihood ratio [11].
Recognizing that the data consists of both the GNSS location measurement and the range measurements, the test
is the ratio of the conditional probability density functions (pdfs) of the measurements under the two hypotheses.
Exploiting the assumed mutual independence of the measurements we have
T (data) =
f (ê, n̂ |H1)
f (ê, n̂ |H0) ·
m∏
k=1
f
(
φ̂k |H1
)
f
(
φ̂k |H0
)
Since the spoofer is assumed to not impact the bearing measurements the product term in this expression is equal
to one and the likelihood ratio reduces to the first term. While this cancellation of the bearing measurements seems
anti-intuitive, that one expects to exploit those measurements as part of the test, they will reappear in the estimation
of the parameters of this resulting likelihood ratio test.
Substituting the pdfs, taking the natural logarithm, and dropping any additive and multiplicative constants, the test
statistic is equivalent to
T =
(ê− e)2 + (n̂− n)2
σ20
− (ê− u)
2 − (n̂− v)2
σ2s
(2)
Unfortunately, most of the variables in this expression are unknown: specifically, u, v, and σs under H1 and e and n
under H0. A common approach, the generalized likelihood ratio test (GLRT) replaces each of these with its maximum
likelihood estimate (MLE) [11]. To consider those MLEs, start with the simpler case of H1:
H1: Under H1 the likelihood function is
L1 =
1
2piσ2s
e
− 1
2σ2s
[(ê−u)2+(n̂−v)2]
m∏
k=1
1√
2piσk
e
− 1
2σ2
k
(φ̂k−φk)2
in which each φk is not a function of u or v. Note that only the first exponential term contains u and v; hence,
the expression is trivially maximized at the MLEs
uMLE = ê and vMLE = n̂
With this result the test statistic simplifies to
T =
(ê− e)2 + (n̂− n)2
σ20
which, we note, does not depend upon σs. We can also drop the denominator constant yielding the equivalent
test
T = (ê− e)2 + (n̂− n)2
H1
>
<
H0
λ (3)
(More generally we could assume a general pdf under spoofing, fs(ê, n̂), so that the second term in Eq. (2) is
log fs(ê, n̂). Under quite general assumptions the MLEs of the parameters under H1 would result in that term
being a constant - zero for the Gaussian case - and the resulting test would still be of the form in Eq. (3).)
H0: Under H0 the likelihood function is
L0 =
1
2piσ20
e
− 1
2σ20
[(ê−e)2+(n̂−n)2] m∏
k=1
1√
2piσk
e
− 1
2σ2
k
(φ̂k−φk)2
in which the φk are now implicitly functions of both e and n. Let eMLE and nMLE represent the MLE of
location. then the GLRT is equivalent to the test
T = (ê− eMLE)2 + (n̂− nMLE)2
H1
>
<
H0
λ (4)
the square of the distance between the MLE under H0, (eMLE, nMLE), and the GNSS measurement, (ê, n̂) (we
can, of course, take the square root of this result and test the distance itself). This is a satisfying solution
– if the GNSS location measurement is close to the location estimate including the bearing information then
declare no spoofing, if it’s far off then declare spoofing.
Below we consider the case of m = 1 first as the mathematics simplifies dramatically; we then consider a linearized
version for m > 1.
MLE
Figure 3: Contours of constant value for the two terms in L0 for m = 1.
ONE BEARING MEASUREMENT
When m = 1 it is possible to make significant headway in solving for the MLE under H0 and in estimating the
performance of the hypothesis test.
Development of the MLE
Consider the likelihood function under H0 for m = 1 with variables e and n (with the single bearing φ being a
function of e, n, e1, and n1)
L0 =
1
2piσ20
e
− 1
2σ20
[(ê−e)2+(n̂−n)2]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
constant on circles
× 1√
2piσ1
e
− 1
2σ21
(φ̂−φ)2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
constant on radials
The first term in this product is constant on circles on the (e, n) plane centered about the GNSS location (ê, n̂ ) with
higher values on the smaller circles; these contours are shown in black in Figure 3 with the red dot denoting the
GNSS location, (ê, n̂). The second term in L0 is constant along radials emanating from the bearing target’s location
(e1, n1); the blue diamond is this location in the figure. Since the MLE, (eMLE, nMLE), is a point on this plane it
falls along some radial line (for example, the center one in the figure); let φMLE represent the value of the bearing to
the MLE. Since the value of the second term of L0 is constant all along this radial, the location of the MLE will be
the point at which the first term in the product is maximized; equivalently, at that point which touches (is tangent
to) the smallest possible of the circles (shown in the figure as the black square).
The radial at angle φMLE has slope equal to tan(φMLE); hence, the possible values for eMLE and nMLE along that
radial are related by
e1 − eMLE = (n1 − nMLE) tanφMLE
To be tangent to a circle this radial line must be perpendicular to the line connecting the MLE location to the center
of the circle, the GNSS location; hence, the MLE’s coordinates must also satisfy
n̂− nMLE = − (ê− eMLE) tanφMLE
Solving these two expressions yields the coordinates of the MLE as
nMLE = n1 sin
2 φMLE + n̂ cos
2 φMLE + (ê− e1) sinφMLE cosφMLE (5)
and
eMLE = e1 cos
2 φMLE + ê sin
2 φMLE + (n̂− n1) sinφMLE cosφMLE (6)
both parameterized by the, yet unknown, MLE of the bearing φMLE. To describe the locus of possible MLE locations
(for varying φMLE) consider the distance, d, from this solution to this midpoint between the GNSS estimate of
location and the bearing target’s location
d (φMLE) ≡
√(
eMLE − ê+ e1
2
)2
+
(
nMLE − n̂+ n1
2
)2
Substituting in the expressions for the MLE’s components and manipulating yields
d (φMLE) =
√
(ê− e1)2 + (n̂− n1)2
4
which is independent of φMLE(!); in other words, the MLE falls somewhere on the circle centered at the midpoint
with diameter equal to the range between the GNSS and the target’s locations (shown in Figure 3 as the red dashed
circle).
There is a one-to-one correspondence between the MLE of the bearing and the location on this circle. Parameterizing
the location by the bearing, φMLE, the log likelihood under H0 (ignoring constants) can be written as
logL0 = − (ê− eMLE)
2
+ (n̂− nMLE)2
σ20
−
(
φ̂− φMLE
)2
σ21
= − [(ê− e1) cosφMLE + (n̂− n1) sinφMLE]
2
σ20
−
(
φ̂− φMLE
)2
σ21
Defining the GNSS-derived values of the bearing and range to the target as
φ˜ ≡ atan2 (e1 − ê,n1 − n̂) and r˜ ≡
√
(e1 − ê)2 + (n1 − n̂)2
(tildes used to indicate GNSS-computed values) we have
n1 − n̂ = r˜ cos φ˜ and e1 − ê = r˜ sin φ˜
so that
logL0 =− r˜
2
σ20
[
sinφMLE cos φ˜− cosφMLE sin φ˜
]2
−
(
φ̂− φMLE
)2
σ21
=− r˜
2
σ20
sin2
(
φMLE − φ˜
)
−
(
φ̂− φMLE
)2
σ21
As φ̂, r˜, and φ˜ are all known from the measurements and σ0 and σ1 are assumed known, this last expression can be
optimized over the choice of φMLE. Specifically, taking a derivative and setting it to zero, the MLE must satisfy the
nonlinear condition
r˜2σ21
σ20
sin
(
φMLE − φ˜
)
cos
(
φMLE − φ˜
)
=
(
φ̂− φMLE
)
(7)
As the functions in this expression are continuous a numerical solution is easily found. For example, Figure 4 shows a
typical log-likelihood function for parameterization r˜ = 300 meters, σ0 = 2 meters, φ˜ = 45
◦, φ̂ = 46◦, and σ1 = 0.5◦;
the MLE of the bearing, marked by the blue circle, is easily found to be at φMLE = 45.37
◦.
Normally under H0 (or H1 with modest amounts of spoofing offset relative to r˜ ) we would expect the MLE of bearing
to be close to the measured bearing; hence, we can employ the small angle approximations
sinx ≈ x and cosx ≈ 1
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Figure 4: The log-likelihood function example.
(the first assuming measurement in radians) and solve for an approximate MLE
φMLE ≈
r˜2σ21
σ20
φ˜+ φ̂
r˜2σ21
σ20
+ 1
=
r˜ 2 γ2 φ˜+ φ̂
r˜ 2 γ2 + 1
where γ = σ1/σ0 (note that with this simplification σ1 must be transformed to units of radians). Clearly as γ varies
from zero (perfect bearing measurements) to infinity (perfect GNSS measurements) this MLE of bearing ranges from
φ̂ to φ˜.
The Resulting Test
It is also possible to directly write the test statistic in terms of the bearings; specifically
T = (ê− eMLE)2 + (n̂− nMLE)2
= r˜ 2 sin2
(
φMLE − φ˜
)
(8)
which is equal to the off-track error of the GNSS location relative to the MLE of the bearing. Again using the small
angle approximation for the sine function this becomes
T ≈ r˜ 2
(
φMLE − φ˜
)2
=
r˜ 2
(r˜ 2 γ2 + 1)
2
(
φ̂− φ˜
)2
(9)
dependent upon the difference between the GNSS-derived and measured bearings scaled by a factor dependent upon
the range.
Performance Simulation
The form of the test statistic in Eq. (8) does not lend itself to a theoretical analysis of performance; hence, multiple
simulations were performed to assess the relative impacts of the parameterization of the scenario. For each the
receiver operating characteristic (ROC - probability of detection plotted versus the probability of false alarm) curves
are shown:
• Spoofer offset – Figure 5, left, shows performance for different amounts of spoofer offset (defined as the “cross
track” difference, the distance perpendicular to the direction to the target). The remaining parametric as-
sumptions are a target at 1000 meters range, GNSS east/north accuracies of 2 meters (σ0 = σs, we set the
spoofer variance to equal the nominal variance as this is, in some senses, the hardest spoofing to detect), and
bearing accuracy of 0.5 degrees (σ1). We observe, as expected, that larger spoofer offsets are easier to de-
tect. Not shown, but verified separately, is that spoofer offsets along the direction to the target are essentially
undetectable.
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
Probability of False Alarm
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y 
of
 D
et
ec
tio
n
offset = 4 meters
8 meters
12 meters
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
Probability of False Alarm
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y 
of
 D
et
ec
tio
n
accuracy = 0.5 degree
0.25 degree
0.125 degree
Figure 5: Simulation results for one bearing target showing the impact of the spoofer’s position offset (left) and the
bearing measurement accuracy (right).
• Bearing accuracy – Figure 5, right, shows performance for different levels of bearing measurement accuracy
(σ1). The remaining parametric assumptions are a target at 1000 meters range, GNSS east/north accuracies
of 2 meters (σ0 = σs), and spoofer offset of 8 meters (cross track). We observe, as expected, that higher
quality bearing measurements make spoofing easier to detect. There is, of course, a point at which better
bearing measurements do not appreciably improve spoofing detectability. The true value of this assessment is
recognizing how good the bearing needs to be to be of any value in spoof detection. For example, that bearing
measurements with standard deviation measured in degrees are of no value.
• Range to the target – Figure 6 shows performance for targets at different ranges, potentially the most interesting
of these simulation results. The remaining parametric assumptions are GNSS east/north accuracies of 2 meters
(σ0 = σs), bearing accuracy of 0.5 degrees (σ1), and a spoofer offset of 12 meters (a little larger here to separate
the ROCs). The obvious geometric interpretation is that closer targets are better for spoofing detection (the
variation in position is effectively r dφ in which dφ is the bearing accuracy and should be comparable in value
to the GNSS variation; larger r means a wider interval for the bearing’s estimate of position).
A Suboptimum Test and its Analysis
Reconsider the linearized form of the test in Eq. (9). If the product r˜γ  1 then one could argue that the coefficient is
approximately a constant and that the test reduces to the square of the difference in the bearing estimates. However,
as the position error for the bearing measurement on is on the order of r˜ dφ ≈ r˜ σ1 then this requirement is equivalent
to stating that the bearing measurement is considerably worse in quality than the GNSS location measurement
r˜γ  1 −→ r˜ σ1
σ0
 1 −→ r˜σ1  σ0
surely an undesirable situation from the perspective of using the bearing as a spoof detector. For a second view, if
the range is large with respect to the GNSS accuracy and the amount of spoofing is small (i.e. the spoofer is trying
to only alter the position by a small distance), then the value of r˜ will not change much between the two hypotheses
and the real variation in the test statistic will be the difference in the two angles. This leads us to consider the
suboptimum test
Tso =
∣∣∣φ̂− φ˜∣∣∣ H1><
H0
λ
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
Probability of False Alarm
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y 
of
 D
et
ec
tio
n
range = 500 meters
1000 meters
2000 meters
Figure 6: Simulation results for one bearing target showing the impact of the range to the bearing target.
The simplicity of this form allows for analysis. Specifically, consider the situation under H0:
• As noted above the measured bearing, φ̂, is assumed to be Gaussian about the true bearing.
• The statistics of the GNSS-derived bearing, φ˜, can be developed from knowledge that the GNSS measurements,
ê and n̂, are jointly Gaussian. Let φ1 and r1 represent the true values of the bearing and range
φ1 ≡ atan2 (e1 − e, n1 − n) and r1 ≡
√
(e1 − e)2 + (n1 − n)2
Using [12, p.390] the probability density function for φ˜ is
f(φ˜) =
r1 cos
(
φ˜− φ1
)
√
2piσ0
exp
−r21 sin2
(
φ˜− φ1
)
2σ20
1−Q
r1 cos
(
φ˜− φ1
)
σ0
+ 1
2pi
exp
(
− r
2
1
2σ20
)
in which Q(·) is the standard Gaussian tail probability. Note that r1 = 0 yields the typical uniform distribution
on [0, 2pi). As r1 becomes large, more of interest here, we can simplify this expression (the Q(·) term goes to
zero and the first term dominates the second) to yield
f(φ˜) −→
r1 cos
(
φ˜− φ1
)
√
2piσ0
exp
−r21 sin2
(
φ˜− φ1
)
2σ20

If we use the small angle trigonometric approximations
sinx ≈ x and cosx ≈ 1
recognizing that under H0 the GNSS bearing is approximately correct then this pdf is
f(φ˜) −→ r1√
2piσ0
exp
−r21
(
φ˜− φ1
)2
2σ20
 = 1√
2pi σ0r1
exp
−
(
φ˜− φ1
)2
2
(
σ0
r1
)2

Gaussian with mean equal to the true bearing and standard deviation equal to σ0/r1.
Figure 7: Spoofing geometry for one bearing target.
• As the two variables, φ̂ and φ˜, are independent Gaussian random variables their difference is also approximately
Gaussian
φ̂− φ˜ ∼ N
(
0, σ21 +
σ20
r21
)
• This approximation provides an expression for the false alarm probability
Pfa = Prob
(∣∣∣φ̂− φ˜∣∣∣ > λ |H0) ≈ 2Q
 λ√
σ21 +
σ20
r21
 (10)
Equivalently, the threshold can be found as
λ =
√
σ21 +
σ20
r21
Q−1
(
Pfa
2
)
(11)
The probability of detection, the performance metric under H1, depends upon the action of the spoofer. Figure 7
shows the relationship with the red square and green dot representing the true and spoofed positions, respectively.
Defining θ as the angular difference between truth and what the spoofer is creating then the distribution of the
bearing difference under H1 is
φ̂− φ˜ ∼ N
(
θ, σ21 +
σ2s
r2s
)
(in which σ2s is the GNSS variance under spoofing, defined above, and rs is the range created by the spoofer) so
Pd = Prob
(∣∣∣φ̂− φ˜∣∣∣ > λ |H1)
≈ Q
 λ+ θ√
σ21 +
σ2s
r2s
+Q
 λ− θ√
σ21 +
σ2s
r2s
 (12)
Figure 8 shows an example of the results for this suboptimum test with range equal to 500 meters, GNSS east/north
accuracies of 2 meters (σ0 = σs), bearing accuracy of 0.25 degrees (σ1), and spoofer offset of 8 meters (cross track).
Included on the plot are the performance of the optimum test above (blue curve, via simulation), performance of
the suboptimum (linearized) test based on the difference in the phase angles (red curve, via simulation), and the
theoretical estimate of performance using the ideas above (black curve). Specifically, we note that the three curves
are indistinguishable.
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Figure 8: Comparison of performance of the suboptimum test.
TWO OR MORE BEARINGS
For simplicity of the development we resort to vector-matrix notation. Let x and x̂G represent the true location and
the GNSS measurement of it, respectively
x =
[
e
n
]
and x̂G =
[
ê
n̂
]
and y be the vector of m bearing measurements
ŷ =
 φ̂1...
φ̂m

Then the log-likelihood function under H0 is
logL0(x) = − 1
σ20
(x̂G − x)T (x̂G − x) − (ŷ − g(x))T Γ−1 (ŷ − g(x)) (13)
where g(·) describes the vector of nonlinear relationships relating e and n to each bearing
g(x) =
 atan2 (e1 − e, n1 − n)...
atan2 (em − e, nm − n)

and Γ is the covariance of the bearing measurements
Γ = diag
(
σ21 , . . . σ
2
m
)
(recall that we assumed that the GNSS errors were uncorrelated; hence, no matrix in the first quadratic form). Since
we are operating under H0 let’s assume that the MLE is close to x̂G and expand g(x) around that point; specifically,
keeping only the linear term in a Taylor series expansion
g(x) ≈ g(x̂G) + J (x− x̂G)
with J the matrix of partial derivatives
J =

∂φ1
∂e
∂φ1
∂n
...
...
∂φm
∂e
∂φm
∂n
 =

(n1 − n̂)
(e1 − ê)2 + (n1 − n̂)2
−(e1 − ê)
(e1 − ê)2 + (n1 − n̂)2
...
...
(nm − n̂)
(em − ê)2 + (nm − n̂)2
−(em − ê)
(em − ê)2 + (nm − n̂)2

=

cos φ˜1
r˜1
− sin φ˜1
r˜1
...
...
cos φ˜m
r˜m
− sin φ˜m
r˜m

With this approximation the log-likelihood at x is approximately
logL0(x) ≈ − 1
σ20
(x̂G − x)T (x̂G − x)− [ŷ − g(x̂G)− J(x− x̂G)]T Γ−1 [ŷ − g(x̂G)− J(x− x̂G)]
= − 1
σ20
(x− x̂G)T (x− x̂G)− (x− x̂G)T JT Γ−1J(x− x̂G)
+ 2 (ŷ − g(x̂G))T Γ−1J(x− x̂G)− (ŷ − g(x̂G))T Γ−1 (ŷ − g(x̂G))
and the necessary condition (setting the vector derivative to zero) to maximize the likelihood is
2
σ20
(x− x̂G)T + 2 (x− x̂G)T JT Γ−1J = 2 (ŷ − g(x̂G))T Γ−1J
or
xMLE = x̂G +
[
1
σ20
I2 + J
T Γ−1J
]−1
JTΓ−1 (g(x̂G)− ŷ) (14)
Specifically, the MLE of the position is equal to the GNSS position plus a transformation of the vector difference
between the GNSS derived bearings, g(x̂G), and the measured bearings, ŷ. Normally one might use these results
to iterate to the MLE; here we assume that the ranges to the bearing targets are large enough so that J does not
change and that the iteration converges in one step.
The resulting test in vector form is
T = |x̂G − x|2
H1
>
<
H0
λ
or, taking a square root,
T =
∣∣∣∣∣
[
1
σ20
I2 + J
T Γ−1J
]−1
JTΓ−1 (g(x̂G)− ŷ)
∣∣∣∣∣ H1><
H0
λ
As an example imagine two targets due east and north of the vehicle, respectively, both 1000 meters away; assume
standard deviations of σ0 = σs = 2 meters and σ1 = σ2 = 0.125
◦. The three subfigures in Figure 9 show the ROCs
for spoofer offset of 8 meters to three points of the compass (northeast, east, and north, respectively). We note
that in each case the result is relatively insensitive to direction of the spoofing. For comparison, the dashed lines
are the detector using only the east target. In one case (the third one, spoofing directly north) this single bearing
result is better than the 2 bearing result due to the decrease in noise; for another (spoofing due east) the spoofing is
undetectable by the single bearing; the remaining case of spoofing to the northeast shows one bearing having poorer
performance than the 2 beacon test.
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Figure 9: Comparison of performance with two beacons; the title numbers specify the spoofed location in east/north.
BEARING AND RANGE
Considering the above results in the context of our earlier results on the use of range measurements [5], a natural
question to ask is what happens if one is given a radar measurement, the pair (r̂, φ̂).
We note that the development of the MLE in Eq. (14) did not depend upon the form of g(·) being limited to bearings.
In fact, this expression still holds for any choice of g as long as we can express J and claim that it does not change
appreciably around x̂G. For y consisting of the range and bearing
y =
[
r
φ
]
=
[ √
(e1 − e)2 + (n1 − n)2
atan2 (e1 − e, n1 − n)
]
then
Jr,φ =

∂r
∂e
∂r
∂n
∂φ
∂e
∂φ
∂n
 =

(e1 − ê)√
(e1 − ê)2 + (n1 − n̂)2
(n1 − n̂)√
(e1 − ê)2 + (n1 − n̂)2
(n1 − n̂)
(e1 − ê)2 + (n1 − n̂G)2
−(e1 − ê)
(e1 − ê)2 + (n1 − n̂)2
 =

sin φ˜ cos φ˜
cos φ˜
r˜
− sin φ˜
r˜

and we can implement a radar-based spoof detection algorithm.
T =
∣∣∣∣∣
[
1
σ20
I2 + J
T
r,φ Γ
−1 Jr,φ
]−1
JTr,φ Γ
−1
[
r˜ − r̂
φ˜− φ̂
]∣∣∣∣∣ H1><
H0
λ
As an example imagine a radar target, 1000 meters away due East; assume standard deviations of σ0 = σs = σr = 2
meters and σφ = 0.115
◦ (the angle accuracy chosen to provide equal position accuracy for the radar’s bearing and
range measurements). The three subfigures in Figure 10 comparing three detectors (full use of range and bearing,
use of range only, and use of bearing only) for three spoofing cases:
• The first shows the result for spoofer movement in both range and bearing; the range only and bearing only
detectors are effectively equivalent (the dotted curves overlap). For the chosen levels of accuracy the range and
bearing measurements appear as equally accurate, but orthogonal, position estimates.
• The second is spoofing movement to the East of 8 meters. As expected this is invisible to the bearing only
detector; the range only detector is slightly better than the full radar detector in that is includes less noise.
• The third is spoofing movement in bearing only (8 meters to the North). Now the movement is invisible to the
range detector; the range based system is superior, again due to less noise.
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Figure 10: Comparison of performance with a radar target.
CONCLUSIONS/FUTURE WORK
This paper shows how bearing measurements can be used to detect spoofing (or as an integrity check) of GNSS
position measurements:
• An exact development of the test was presented for the case of a single bearing measurement. While a analytical
performance analysis is impossible due to the complexity of the test, a suboptimum version (based only on
the bearing measurement and the GNSS-induced bearing) seems to perform equally well for small amounts of
spoofing and does allow for a performance analysis (and selection of threshold).
• These single bearing results also provide insight into how the relative accuracies of the GNSS position and the
bearing induced position impact spoofing detectability. Specifically, bearing measurements with an accuracy
of 1 degree are ineffective unless the range to the target is measured in the hundreds of meters; for kilometer
(or larger) ranges, sub-degree bearings are needed.
• A linearized spoofing test was fully developed for 2 or more bearing measurements; examples were presented
showing that 2 bearings eliminate the spoofer’s ability to defeat the test.
• The linearized approach was extended to a bearing/range measurement pair (e.g. a radar output); again, the
results allow a discussion on the needed accuracy of the measurements.
Future work can go in a variety of directions:
• Randomness in the location of the bearing targets’ locations: Consider the situation in which the locations of
the bearing targets themselves include some uncertainty. Perhaps the locations are just not well known, or that
they can move due to some external stimulus (e.g. tide, current, or wind moving a bearing source mounted on
a buoy).
• Correlated GNSS errors: All of the results above assumed uncorrelated errors on the GNSS measurement. The
model in (1) can be extended, allowing a more general covariance model for ê and n̂. Specifically, let Σg be
this covariance
Σg =
[
σ2e ρσeσn
ρσeσn σ
2
n
]
which can be incorporated into the development leading up to Eq. (13). Further, the m = 1 case can be
redeveloped in which the MLE is characterized by the point on an ellipse determined by Σg tangent to the
radial.
• Bias in the bearings: The development in this paper assumed that the bearing measurements were unbiased. A
better model would be to include (correlated) bias for each measurement; one solution might be to use additional
measurements to estimate the bias (as additional GNSS pseudoranges allow one to estimate common clock bias).
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